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Abstract 
 
The article traces the evolution of the legal competences of the European Union (EU) in international investment 
regulation from the Spaak Report (1956) to the Lisbon Treaty (2009). It focuses on the question why and how 
the EU gradually acquired legal competences in this key domain of global economic governance. The analysis 
suggests that Commission entrepreneurship and spill-overs from other EU policies were the most important 
factors fuelling the extension of the EU’s legal competences. The Member States, on the other hand, sought to 
prevent a competence transfer. European business – arguably the main stakeholder – was mostly uninterested or 
divided regarding the EU’s role in international investment policy. The findings have implications for our 
perception of business lobbying in international investment policy and potentially for the legal interpretation and 
delimitation of the EU’s new competences.  
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1. Introduction 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 brought the regulation of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) under the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The European 
Union (EU)1 is now exclusively competent to regulate FDI. The Member States have by and large lost 
the necessary competences to pursue their own international investment policies. Hence, international 
investment policy-making now takes place at the EU level. International investment policy is here 
defined to encompass the regulation of investment liberalisation, post-establishment treatment 
standards and investment protection through international investment agreements (IIAs). The EU’s 
role and competences in international investment policy have been a controversial topic for many 
decades. While the Commission persistently pushed for an extension of the EU’s role and 
competences in this key domain of global economic governance since the 1970s, the Member States 
have constantly sought to resist such calls.  
 
This article traces these debates and the evolution of the EU’s legal competences in international 
investment policy-making from the Spaak Report (1956) until the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) in order to 
explain how and why the EU acquired the exclusive competence over FDI regulation. The analysis 
focuses on four factors, which are likely to have shaped the EU’s competences in international 
                                                        
1 For the sake of clarity, the article refers to today’s EU and all its precursor organisations such as the European 
Economic Communities or the European Communities as EU. It is not assumed that these organizations had the 
same legal and political attributes as today’s EU.  
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investment policy: 1) Commission preferences, 2) Member State preferences, 3) business preferences, 
and 4) spill-overs from other EU policies. It finds that policy entrepreneurship by the Commission as 
well as spill-overs were the main factors shaping the EU’s legal competences in this domain. While 
business was little interested in debates on the distribution of competences, the Member States mostly 
opposed an extension of Union competences in this domain. This article is primarily of empirical 
ambition. From a political science perspective, the findings nonetheless clearly lend support to neo-
functional and institutionalist thinking on European Integration.  
 
The article uses analytical process tracing as its main method. It builds on archival research, secondary 
literature and 42 anonymised interviews with European and national officials as well as business 
representatives. The article reconstructs policy debates in the context of intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs) and proceedings in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to 
assess why the EU gradually acquired legal competences to regulate international investment flows. 
The article intends to make a threefold contribution. First, it closes an empirical gap in the literature on 
the EU’s political and legal genesis as an actor in the international investment regime. Second, the 
article contributes to better delimit the exact scope of the EU’s new exclusive competences by 
shedding some light on the rationale behind the competence transfer. Finally, it shows that business 
may be less of driver of international investment policy-making than conventionally thought.  
 
2. First Steps – The EU and International Investment Regulation from the 1950s to the 1980s 
It was only in the 1980s that international investment became an important economic phenomenon. 
Hence, it was only at that point that intense policy debates on the role and competences of the EU and 
the Member States in this domain started. It is, however, worth mentioning that European policy-
makers touched twice on this issue in the early years of European Integration when preparing the 
Treaty of Rome and in discussions on Opinion 1/75 on the need to harmonise Member States’ export 
policies.  
 
2.1 The Treaty of Rome  
The Treaty of Rome did not provide the EU with legal competences in the regulation of international 
investment flows. The preparatory debates and the so-called Spaak Report2 of April 1956 nevertheless 
touched on the EU’s role in regulating FDI flows. Intergovernmental discussions did not touch on the 
EU’s role in this domain when evaluating the future CCP but the free movement of capital. According 
to the Spaak Report, the envisaged Common Market should inter alia provide for the free movement 
of capital. The report cautioned that the liberalisation of capital movements among the Member States 
would, however, require the establishment of a common external capital regime dealing with extra-EU 
                                                        
2 Comité intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, MAE 120 f/56, 1956, 
<http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/Rome/preparation/Spaak%20report%20fr
.pdf.> accessed on 4 June 2016.   
 3 
capital flows including FDI. Otherwise a regulatory gap would emerge since capital could enter and 
leave the Common Market through Member States with liberal capital regimes and then flow into 
Member States with more protectionist capital regimes. As the Spaak Report stated: 
 
Le… obstacle, c’est la possibilité que les capitaux passent d’un pays vers un autre, non 
pour s’y investir mais pour échapper vers l’extérieur au bénéfice d’une inégalité dans la 
rigueur des contrôles. La liberté de la circulation des capitaux à l’intérieur du marché 
commun appelle donc dans les relations avec les pays tiers à une certaine attitude 
commune qui … au stade finale, aboutirait à une égale liberté ou à un dégrée de contrôle 
équivalent.3  
 
The governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands convened 
between June 1956 and March 1957 to draft the Treaty of Rome. Despite the Spaak Report’s 
recommendation to liberalise intra-EU capital movements, they adopted a cautious approach. Article 
69 EEC 4  stated that the free movement of capital was only a subordinate treaty freedom. The 
liberalisation of capital movements should only proceed through secondary legislation and to the 
extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market for goods and services.5 In consequence, 
the need for a common external capital regime did not arise. As explained in Section 3.2, it was only 
with the demise of Keynesianism and the emergence of the neoliberal paradigm in the 1980s that the 
Member States started advancing the free movement of capital within the Common Market. 
Keynesianism postulated far-reaching state intervention in the economy and in particular control over 
cross-border capital flows to enable governments to use monetary policy and interest rates for 
macroeconomic steering. Only when policy-makers turned toward neo-liberalism in the 1980s, which 
foresaw the strengthening of market mechanisms for an efficient allocation of resources within and 
across economies, they showed willing to dismantle capital controls within the Common Market.  
 
2.2 Opinion 1/75 – the Commission Pushes for a European BIT Program 
The EU’s role in the regulation of international investment policy became again the subject of debates 
in the 1970s. In late 1972 and 1975, the Commission published two draft regulations, which sought to 
establish a European export policy as an integral part of the CCP.6 One draft regulation foresaw the 
                                                        
3 ibid 93–94. 
4 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communities (EEC) [1957] Eur-lex 11957E. 
5 Age Bakker, The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe - The Monetary Committee and Financial 
Integration, 1958-1994 (Kluwer 1996) 42-44; Christoph Ohler, Europäische Kapital- und 
Zahlungsverkehrsfreiheit: Kommentar zu den Artikeln 56 bis 60 EGV, der Geldwäscherichtlinie und 
Überweisungsrichtlinie (Springer 2002) 1-3; Johan Usher, ‘Capital Movements and the Treaty on European 
Union’ (1992) 12 Yearbook of European Law 35–57. 
6 Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung “Vorschlag einer Verordnung (EWG) des 
Rates zur Errichtung einer Europäischen Ausfuhrbank“ (Drucksache 7/4882 1976); Leif Johannsen, ‘Die 
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creation of a European investment guarantee agency. The investment guarantees should insure 
European investors against non-commercial investment risks in third countries. Access to common 
investment guarantees should be conditional on the existence or conclusion of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) between the EU and the concerned third countries.7 The Commission’s draft regulation 
referred to Article 113 EEC8 as the competence basis for the creation of the EU investment guarantee 
agency and the conclusion of EU BITs.  
 
The Member States met the draft regulations with great hesitation.9 The Council criticised that the 
harmonisation of national export policy had priority over the creation of a complementary EU policy. 
The German government stressed that national export policies provided sufficient coverage to all 
European investment and export projects. The German Bundestag warned that the creation of a EU 
investment guarantee scheme would bear incalculable financial risks for German taxpayers. The 
French government sought to protect its competences and sovereignty. The EU was entitled to 
harmonise national policies, but did not hold the necessary competences to become a proper actor in 
this domain. In order to force the Member States to accept its draft regulations, the Commission had 
recourse to legal review in Opinion 1/75.10 The Opinion examined and recognised the EU’s legal 
competence to harmonise national export policies. The Opinion did not, however, provide a basis to 
push for a European BIT program. 
 
3. The Treaty of Maastricht 
Lasting in-depth debates on the EU’s competences in international investment policy began with the 
Uruguay Round in the GATT and the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht IGC touched on 
the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy in the context of the negotiations on the 
Treaty chapters on the CCP and the free movement of capital. While the Commission was 
unsuccessful in its attempt to assert competences over international investment regulation in 
negotiations about the CCP, the EU accidentally acquired legal fringe competences regarding 
investment liberalisation under the revised chapter on capital movements.  
 
3.1 The Commission Fails to ‘Update’ the Common Commercial Policy 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für ausländische Direktinvestitionen nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon‘ 
(2009) 90 Beiträge zum Transnationalem Wirtschaftsrecht 5-6; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Versicherung 
nichtkommerzieller Risiken und die Europäische Gemeinschaft (Carl Heymanns 1977) 54-59. 
7 Johannsen (n 6) 5-6; Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 6) 54-59.  
8 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communities (n 4). 
9 For this and the following see Johannsen (n 6) 5-6 and Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 6) 56 -59.  
10 CJEU, Opinion 1/75, Opinion of the Court of 11 November 1975 Given Pursuant to Article 228 (6) of the EEC 
Treaty [1975] ECR 1355. 
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The Member States convened for the IGC on the Treaty of Maastricht between December 1991 and 
February 1992. In March 1991, the Commission published a report on the functioning of the EU 
discussing advisable modifications to the European Treaties. 11  With regard to the CCP, the 
Commission proposed a far-ranging reform. It suggested renaming the CCP into ‘Common Policy of 
External Economic Relations’. The new policy should encompass the regulation of trade in goods, 
services, export policy, intellectual property rights, capital movements, investments, establishment and 
competition through trade agreements and autonomous measures. The Commission explicitly 
emphasised that the EU would be competent to regulate investment liberalisation as well as 
investment protection. The Commission, moreover, underlined that the CCP already encompassed the 
regulation of these issues and that it merely sought to clarify but not to substantially broaden the scope 
of the EU’s competences. The reform should ensure the effective ‘representation of the union on the 
external scene and notably in dealings with international organizations’.12 The Commission advanced 
a teleological interpretation of the CCP in its report, which was informed by the agenda of the on-
going Uruguay Round. It perceived the CCP as the interface between the EU’s Single Market and 
GATT negotiations. Hence, the scope of the CCP – as intermediary between the Single Market and the 
GATT regime – had to evolve in line with the agenda of GATT negotiations.13  
 
The Member States did not receive the Commission’s recommendations well. During the debates on 
the Commission’s negotiating mandate for the Uruguay Round in September 1986, the Member States 
underlined that they had empowered the Commission to speak on all new trade issues including 
investment, but that this decision did not prejudge the competence question. The Member States were 
convinced that most new trade issues came under national or shared competence.14 From the point of 
view of the Member States, the Commission denounced the gentlemen’s agreement not to raise the 
competence question during the Uruguay Round and exploited its role as single voice in the GATT. 
The consecutively discussed draft treaties illustrate the Member States’ opposition to the 
Commission’s proposal and in particular to an extension of the CCP to international investment 
regulation. Already the first draft text of the Maastricht Treaty of 17 April 1991 did not contain most 
of the proposed amendments to the CCP articles including the reference to international investment 
regulation. The final text of the Maastricht Treaty indeed did not modify the CCP articles at all but 
preserved the wording of the Treaty of Rome.15 
                                                        
11 On this and the following see Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
CONF-UP 1788/91, 1991, 16, 28–29. 
12 ibid 28.  
13 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011) 28.  
14 Robert Basedow, ‘The EU’s new International Investment Policy’ (LSE Ethesis 2015) 114; Hugeo Paemen 
and Alexandra Bensch, From the GATT to the WTO: The European Community in the Uruguay Round (Leuven 
University Press 1995) 56.  
15 Eeckhout (n 13) 26-27; See Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
CONF-UP 1845/91, 1991, 31; Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
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The European business community was little involved in these debates. UNICE – today 
BusinessEurope – formally submitted its position paper to the IGC on 10 April 1991.16 The paper is 
fairly vague on the CCP. It merely states that trade policy measures should be subject to qualified 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers to ensure swift and effective decision-making.17 While the 
statement in principle called upon the Member States to adjust the scope of the CCP to the evolving 
GATT agenda, the absence of any concrete reference to services trade or investment suggests that 
European business did not attach great important to the CCP.  
 
3.2 Competence by Spill-Over – A Common External Capital Regime and Investment Market 
Access 
The Treaty of Maastricht did not reform the CCP. The Treaty of Maastricht, however, established a 
common external capital regime governing capital flows between the Member State and third 
countries. While this Treaty revision was not meant to affect the EU’s role in international investment 
policy, it had a spill-over effect as it unintentionally provided the EU with a shared competence to 
regulate investment market access.  
 
The creation of an external capital regime had become necessary due to the advances in the creation of 
a Common Market for capital in the 1980s. The demise of Keynesianism and rise of the neoliberal 
paradigm motivated the Commission to push for the finalisation of the Single Market by 1992. The 
Single Market Program intended to strengthen market mechanisms to promote the efficient allocation 
of scarce resources within the European economy. As part of its Single Market Program, it managed to 
convince the Member States to enact the milestone directive 88/361/EEC 18  in 1988, which 
instantaneously liberalised all capital movements within the Single Market.19  Policy-makers soon 
realised that they had created a regulatory gap and that they needed to establish a common external 
capital regime. As predicted in the Spaak Report of 1956, capital entered and left the Common Market 
through Member States with liberal capital regimes thereby circumventing the capital regimes of more 
protectionist Member States.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
CONF-UP 1850/91, 1991, 30; Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
CONF-UP 1862/91, 1991, 31; Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, 
CONF-UP-UEM 2017/91, 1991, 59.  
16 Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, CONF-UP 1792/91, 1991, 9.  
17 ibid. 
18 Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [1988] OJ L 
178. 
19 Bakker (n 5) 210-212.  
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Council debates on the creation of an external capital regime started in 1988 and came to an end with 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. On insistence of the Commission, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy the Maastricht Treaty established an external capital regime based 
on the ‘erga omnes’ principle providing for free capital movement between Member States and third 
countries. Article 70 EC20, however, stated that the EU – but not the individual Member States – could 
re-impose temporary capital restriction in the event of major economic and monetary turmoil in a 
Member State or in order to comply with international sanctions. The regulation of extra-EU capital 
movements thereby came under shared Union and Member State competence.21   
 
While it had not been the intention of the Member States, the creation of an external capital regime 
inevitably gave the EU a role in regulating investment market access. Cross-border capital movements 
constitute an important component of market access, the establishment and subsequent operation of 
foreign affiliates. As the EU acquired a shared competence over cross-border capital movements, the 
EU equally acquired a shared competence of relevance in international investment policy.  
 
4. Court Battles over the Scope of the Common Commercial Policy 
During the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States had brushed off the Commission’s 
attempt to ‘clarify’ the allegedly highly comprehensive scope of the CCP. As the following section 
shows, the Commission remained determined to have the Member States recognise the EU’s exclusive 
competence under the CCP to regulate all new trade issues of the Uruguay Round, including 
international investment. The Commission sought to enforce its views through legal review in 
Opinions 1/94 and 2/92. The Commission’s strategic recourse to the CJEU was, however, only little 
successful as the Court was unwilling to override the opposition of the Member States.  
 
4.1 Opinion 1/94 – The Commission Seeks to Revisit the Maastricht Failure 
Opinion 1/9422 was, in essence, a continuation of the IGC debates on the CCP. After eight years of 
negotiations, the GATT parties had finally concluded the Uruguay Round in April 1994. The outcome 
of these lengthy negotiations was the WTO Agreement, which encompassed in its annexes, inter alia, 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). As could be expected, the Commission and the Member States disagreed 
over the question of whether the scope of the CCP was sufficiently broad to enable the EU to conclude 
                                                        
20 Treaty establishing the European Community (EC) [1992] 35 OJ C224. 
21 Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: the Scope of Protection in 
EU law (OUP 2009) 37-38. Usher (n 5) 42-43, 46-47. 
22 CJEU, Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning 
Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property - Article 228 (6) of the EC Treaty [1994] ECR I-5267. 
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the WTO Agreement and its annexes alone or whether it had to be concluded as a mixed agreement. In 
April 1994, the Commission decided to refer this question to the CJEU.23  
 
The Commission’s submission to the CJEU made the claim that the EU was exclusively competent to 
conclude the WTO Agreement and its annexes. The Commission developed a twofold justification for 
its position. First, the CCP articles had to be interpreted in a teleological manner. In other words, the 
authors of the Treaties had conceived the CCP in 1956/57 in order to ensure the effective 
representation of the Union in trade negotiations and notably in GATT talks. Hence, the legal scope of 
the CCP had to evolve in line with the scope of GATT negotiations.24 Second, the Commission added 
that the Union also held implied, exclusive, external competences regarding all issues covered in the 
WTO Agreement and its annexes under other Treaty chapters.25 It needs mention that although the 
Commission’s submission did not explicitly dwell on the Union’s legal competences in international 
investment policy, it contained the implicit claim that the Union held comprehensive competences in 
this domain. The WTO Agreement and its annexes covered investment liberalisation (GATS) and 
post-establishment treatment (GATS, TRIMs & TRIPs Agreements), which accordingly had to fall 
under exclusive Union competence. It, moreover, implied that it was only a question of time before all 
aspects of international investment policy would come under exclusive Union competence.26 The 
United States had strongly pushed for the establishment of a comprehensive investment framework 
under the GATT and then in the OECD since the 1980s. Free trade agreements (FTAs), moreover, 
gradually came to include ambitious investment chapters since the 1990s.  
 
The Member States determinedly rejected the Commission’s arguments. The submission of the 
Council of Ministers and the individual submissions of the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark demanded a mixed ratification of the WTO Agreement and 
its annexes. The Council, moreover, harshly rebuked the Commission’s attempt to revise the scope of 
the CCP through judicial review after its failure in the Maastricht IGC, arguing that:   
 
At the intergovernmental conference on Political Union, the Commission had proposed 
such an extension of Community competence. The concept of a common commercial 
policy was to be replaced by that of a common policy of external economic relations, 
comprising in particular ‘economic and trade measures in respect of services, capital, 
intellectual property, investment, establishment and competition’ with the possibility of 
extension of that ambit. This policy was to fall within the exclusive competence of the 
                                                        
23 Eeckhout (n 13) 27; Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart 2006) 41.  
24 Koutrakos (n 23) 40-41.  
25 Eeckhout (n 13) 87-89.  
26 Johannsen (n 6) 7; Basedow (n 14).  
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Community …The Community was to be exclusively represented by the Commission in 
its relations with non-member countries and international organizations and at 
international conferences … The Commission is seeking in its request for an Opinion to 
have implemented by means of judicial interpretation, the proposals which were rejected 
at the intergovernmental conference on Political Union.27 
 
The CJEU sided in its Opinion of November 1994 with the Member States. It found that the WTO 
Agreement and its annexes had to be concluded as a mixed agreement since the Union did not hold all 
necessary competences neither under the CCP nor under other Treaty chapters. The CJEU ruling did 
not examine in detail the Union’s competences in international investment policy, but it advanced a 
literal, narrow interpretation of the CCP. The CJEU thus refuted the Commission’s claim that the new 
trade issues, including international investment regulation, already came under the scope of the CCP. 
Second, the CJEU ruled that GATS mode III – roughly identical to service-related investments – did 
not come under the scope of the CCP.28 Hence, investment liberalisation in general was unlikely to 
come under the CCP. Finally, the CJEU did not challenge the EU’s competence to conclude the 
TRIMs Agreement. The TRIMs Agreement regulated trade-related post-establishment treatment 
standards. The CJEU’s silence on this issue implied that the EU was, at least partly, competent under 
the CCP in this domain of international investment policy. In conclusion, Opinion 1/94 was a heavy-
handed attempt by the Commission to extend the EU’s legal competence to new trade issues including 
investment regulation despite Member State opposition.  
 
4.2 Opinion 2/92 – The Commission Claims Competence over Post-Establishment Treatment 
Shortly after delivering Opinion 1/94, the CJEU rendered Opinion 2/9229 in March 1995. Opinion 2/92 
is of great interest to the present study, because it essentially examined the EU’s competence to 
regulate post-establishment treatment. It sought to identify the adequate competence basis for the EU’s 
adhesion to the ‘Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment’. The Third Revised 
Decision was a gentlemen’s agreement among OECD countries, which stipulated that OECD countries 
should grant established investors from other OECD countries national treatment. The Commission 
and the Member States disagreed over the competence basis for the EU’s adhesion to the Third 
Revised Decision.30 
 
                                                        
27 CJEU (n 22) I-15306.  
28 Eeckhout (n 13) 30; Johannsen (n 6) 7. 
29 CJEU, Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or One of its Institutions to Participate in the Third 
Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment [1995] ECR I-521. 
30 Christoph Vedder and Hans-Peter Folz, ‘A Survey of Principal Decisions of the European Court of Justice 
Pertaining to International Law in 1995’ (1997) 8 EJIL 508, 510-511. 
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The Commission claimed that the EU was exclusively competent to adhere to the Third Revised 
Decision.31 First, the Commission argued that the Third Revised Decision was a trade policy measure 
since international investment was a modern form of trade substituting and complementing traditional 
trade in goods. The Third Revised Decision sought to increase investment and thus trade activity. This 
logic implied that all aspects of international investment policy – market access, post-establishment 
treatment and protection – had to be considered as trade policy measures under the CCP. Second, the 
Commission advanced once again its teleological CCP interpretation. Since the main purpose of the 
CCP arguably was to ensure the effective international representation of European interests and the 
Single Market at the international level, the scope of the CCP had to evolve in line with trade-related 
negotiations in the GATT or OECD. Finally, the Commission added that should the Court disagree 
with the previous arguments, the EU nevertheless held an implicit, exclusive, external competence to 
adhere to the Third Revised Decision under Article 57 EC (establishment) and Article 100 EC 
(approximation of legislation). 
 
Several Member States refuted the Commission’s position and justifications.32  Their submissions 
complement in many regards missing information on detailed Member State positions from the IGC 
on the Maastricht Treaty. The Belgian, Greek, Spanish, French and British rejected the claim that the 
EU was competent to adhere to the Third Revised Decision under the CCP. Some Member States 
elaborated that international investment was not a modern form of trade. Other Member States added 
that the Third Revised Decision would not affect trade flows and could thus not be considered to be a 
trade policy measure. Belgium, Greece, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom added that 
Article 57 EC (establishment) was the more pertinent competence basis for the EU to adhere to the 
Third Revised Decision, but stressed that it only provided for a shared rather than implied exclusive 
external competence.  
 
The CJEU ruled that the Member States and the EU were jointly competent to adhere to the Third 
Revised Decision. First, the CJEU ruled that the Third Revised Decision was in part a trade policy 
measure coming under CCP and exclusive Union competence as regards its effects on extra-EU trade 
and investment flows. This interpretation implied that national treatment and more broadly post-
establishment treatment of foreign investors in extra-EU relations fell under exclusive Union 
competence. But the Member States nonetheless continued concluding hundreds of BITs with national 
treatment provisions in the following years. Second, it found that the Third Revised Decision was a 
measure affecting intra-EU trade and investment as regards the participation of foreign-owned 
enterprises in trade and investment within the internal market. Hence, the Third Revised Decision was 
subject to internal market rules coming under shared and/or national competence. Third, the CJEU 
                                                        
31 For this and the following see CJEU (n 29) I-542-546. 
32 For this and the following see CJEU (n 29) I–542–549.  
 11 
elaborated that the Third Revised Decision was a measure coming under the Common Transport 
Policy and shared competence as regards its effect on the transport sector. 33  To conclude, the 
Commission sought in Opinions 1/94 and 2/92 to have the CJEU recognise the EU’s comprehensive 
competences in foreign economic relations including in investment regulation, but the CJEU was 
unwilling to override Member State opposition.  
 
5. The Treaty of Amsterdam  
The debates on the scope of the EU’s legal competences in international investment policy continued 
in the IGC on the so-called Treaty of Amsterdam. The Council of Ministers asked the Commission to 
submit a report on necessary reforms of the EU and its Treaties. The Commission problematized once 
again the EU’s legal competences in foreign economic relations, in general, and in international 
investment policy, in particular.34 
 
The Commission’s report of May 1995 criticised that the Maastricht Treaty had missed the chance to 
modernise and to extend the legal scope of the CCP. 35  The recent rulings of the CJEU had further 
narrowed the scope of the CCP. The standard agenda of international trade negotiations largely 
exceeded the EU’s legal competences, which complicated EU-internal decision-making and harmed 
the EU’s interests in the world economy. The Commission advised the Member States to extend the 
scope of the CCP so as to bring it in line with the standard agenda of international trade negotiations. 
The CCP should cover, in particular, the regulation of services trade, intellectual property rights and 
‘FDI’. FDI had become increasingly important for the world economy and had a trade complementing 
and substituting effect. The continuous conclusion of BITs between the Member States and third 
countries undermined the exercise of the EU’s competences in the regulation of capital movements. It, 
moreover, frustrated the EU’s trade policy interests as many third countries conditioned market access 
for goods and services on investment commitments and activity. Whereas other countries could easily 
deal with this issue linkage, the EU was paralysed.  
 
The Commission explained its position regarding international investment policy in further detail in a 
communication, which it released only a few weeks before the publication of the above-mentioned 
report. The communication was entitled ‘A level playing field for direct investment world-wide’.36 It 
sought to influence EU-internal debates on the Treaty of Amsterdam as well as the negotiations on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the OECD. The Commission argued that neither the EU nor 
                                                        
33 ibid. See also Vedder and Folz (n 30) 510–511.  
34 European Commission, ‘Report on the Operation of the Treaty on the European Union’ (internal document) 
SEC (95) 731 final, 1-7.  
35 For this and the following see ibid 57-58.  
36 European Commission, ‘A Level Playing Field for Direct Investment World-Wide’ (Communication) COM 
(95) 42 final, 1-14. 
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the Member States possessed the necessary legal competences to negotiate NAFTA-like state-of-the-
art international investment agreements covering investment liberalisation, post-establishment 
treatment and protection. European investors increasingly suffered from competitive disadvantages 
vis-à-vis Japanese and US investors. Hence, the EU and the Member States should pool their 
competences and jointly negotiate state-of-the-art BITs with third countries. 
 
The Member States showed only marginal interest in a reform of the CCP during the IGC debates in 
1996 and early 1997. Only the IGC submissions of Germany, Italy and Sweden mention the general 
intention to discuss the CCP.37 Other Member States did not enumerate the CCP as a priority for IGC 
debates. Drawing on the above-examined Opinions 1/94 and 2/92, one may safely conclude that most 
Member States met the Commission’s proposal to extend the scope of the CCP to investment 
regulation with considerable hesitation. Most Member States refuted demands to reform the CCP both 
in order to preserve their national competences and because they considered these issues to be 
unrelated to international trade.38 
 
The Irish Council Presidency, which chaired the IGC in the second semester of 1996, nonetheless tried 
to take the Commission’s recommendations to reform the CCP into account. Its first discussion paper 
of 5 December 1996 proposed to the Member States the permanent empowerment of the Commission 
to negotiate on investment, services trade and intellectual property rights in the WTO.39 The Member 
States should remain competent to regulate these issues in domestic settings and to negotiate in other 
international fora like the OECD, IMF and World Bank. Despite this pragmatic approach, the Member 
States remained determined to protect their competences against European encroachment. The 
proposal of the Presidency was quickly discarded in IGC debates.40 The Treaty of Amsterdam41, which 
entered into force in 1999, did not reform the CCP. 
 
6. The Treaty of Nice  
                                                        
37 European Parliament, ‘White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference Volume II – Germany’ (1996) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-de_en.htm> accessed 30 March 2016. European Parliament, 
‘White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference Volume II – Italy’ (1996) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-it_en.htm> accessed 30 March 2016. European Parliament, ‘White 
Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference Volume II – Sweden’ (1996) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-sv_en.htm> accessed 30 March 2016. 
38 Johannsen (n 6) 8; CJEU (n 29) I–542-549. 
39 Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, ‘The European Union Today and 
Tomorrow – Adapting the European Union for the Benefit of its Peoples and Preparing it for the Future – a 
General Outline for a Draft Revision of the Treaties (CONF2500/96)’, 1996. 
40 Johannsen (n 6) 8.  
41 Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC) [1997] 40 OJ C340. 
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The Treaty of Amsterdam was widely considered a failure. The Member States thus convened for the 
IGC on the Treaty of Nice between February 2000 and 2001 to enhance the democratic legitimacy and 
to prepare the EU for the Eastern Enlargement.  
 
In early 2000, the Commission submitted to the Council of Ministers a report on advisable reforms of 
the EU.42 It again emphasised the need to reform the CCP so as to avoid a policy-making deadlock in 
an enlarged EU. The Commission underlined that the CCP had to be extended toward the new trade 
issues, including international investment regulation, in order to ensure qualified majority voting on 
trade policy measures in the Council of Ministers. As investment, services trade and intellectual 
property rights had become standard agenda items of trade negotiations, modern trade agreements had 
to be concluded as mixed agreements requiring unanimity. The CCP had thus de facto devolved 
during the 1980s and 1990s from a policy domain governed by the ‘community method’ and qualified 
majority voting toward an intergovernmental policy. The Member States remained hesitant regarding 
the Commission’s recommendations. A series of progress reports demonstrates how the proposed 
extension of the CCP to international investment regulation was gradually scrapped during the 
negotiating process.43 
 
But despite the Member States’ opposition to extend the EU’s competence in the realm of 
international investment regulation, the Treaty of Nice, nevertheless, provided the EU with first 
exclusive legal competences under the CCP to regulate certain aspects of international investment 
activities. Again, unintended spill-overs came to play. Article 133 EC45 brought the regulation of trade 
in services under the scope of the CCP. Soon after the conclusion of the IGC on the Treaty of Nice, 
academics46 started discussing whether the notion of trade in services in the revised Treaty provisions 
was congruent with the notion of trade in services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).47 The GATS recognises the establishment of a commercial presence abroad, which is by and 
large synonymous with foreign investment activity, as one mode of services trade. The GATS 
schedules thus contain commitments on market access and post-establishment treatment of foreign 
investment of service providers. At first, academics denied the assumption that the regulation of 
                                                        
42 For this and the following see European Commission, ‘Adapting the Institutions to Make Success of 
Enlargement’ (communication) COM (2000) 34 final, 25-27. 
43 Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, ‘Progress Report on the 
Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Reform (CONFER 4790/00)’ 2000, 39-42. Conference of the 
representatives of the governments of the Member States, ‘Revised Summary - Intergovernmental Conference on 
Institutional Reform (CONFER 4810/00)’ 2000, 23-28. Conference of the representatives of the governments of 
the Member States, ‘Revised Summary - Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Reform (CONFER 
4815/00)’ 2000, 34-37.  
45 Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC) (Nice consolidated version) [2002] OJ C325.  
46 Johannsen (n 6) 9. 
47 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf> 
accessed 3 June 2016. 
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service-related investment now came under the CCP, as the Member States had refused to extend the 
CCP to investment regulation.48 In the following time, however, the opinio juris formed that the 
Member States had intended to empower the EU to participate in GATS-like negotiations on services 
trade. The new competence thus had to encompass the regulation of service-related investment 
liberalisation and arguably post-establishment treatment. 
 
7. The Treaty of Lisbon  
The Treaty of Nice, much like the Treaty of Amsterdam, was considered a failure. It did not prepare 
the EU for the upcoming accession of 12 new Member States in 2004 and 2007. The European 
Council of Laeken in December 2001 therefore decided to embark on another attempt to reform the 
EU. It decided to use the so-called ‘Convention method’ to revise the European Treaties.49  The 
‘convention method’ considerably differed from the classic intergovernmental method of Treaty 
revisions. It sought to limit secret bargains among national technocrats and instead to promote 
transparent deliberations among elected politicians over necessary reforms and ultimately the creation 
of a European federal state.50 As the following Section demonstrates, the procedural particularities of 
the Convention method decisively facilitated the Commission’s long-standing policy entrepreneurship 
to extend the CCP to international investment regulation. The section first discusses how Commission 
entrepreneurship in conjunction with the procedural particularities of the Convention method led to the 
extension of the CCP to FDI regulation in a first draft treaty. It then assesses how the Member States 
unsuccessfully opposed these developments and how European business was divided over the merits 
of a EU international investment policy.  
 
The so-called Convention on the Future of Europe met between 28 February 2002 and 20 July 2003 in 
order to elaborate the draft text for the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional 
Treaty). The draft text was then sent to the Member States for final discussions and ratification. The 
Convention comprised 102 delegates from the Member State governments and parliaments, the 
European Parliament, the Commission and accession countries. A Praesidium of 12 delegates – led by 
former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – chaired the Convention.51 
 
7.1 Commission Entrepreneurship in the Open and Behind the Scenes of the Convention  
                                                        
48 For this and the following Koutrakos (n 23) 61-62; Marise Cremona, ‘A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The 
Common Commercial Policy After Nice’ in Alan Dashwood, Christoph Hillion, John Spencer and Angela Ward 
(eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2001-2002) (Hart 2003), 61, 68-70.  
49 Florence Deloche-Gaudez, ‘The Convention on a Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Method for the Future?’ 
Notre Europe Research Policy Paper (2001) 15; European Convention, ‘The European Convention’(2003), 
<http://european-convention.eu.int> accessed 8 October 2013. 
50 Deloche-Gaudez (n 49). 
51 European Convention (n 49).  
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At the beginning, the main work was carried out in 11 working groups. The CCP came under the 
responsibility of Working Group VII on external action, whose delegates showed little interest in 
technical debates on the CCP but focused on the EU’s Common Foreign, Security and Defence 
Policies, as it was the time of the Iraq War.52 On 15 October 2002, the Commissioner for Trade Pascal 
Lamy nonetheless addressed Working Group VII in order to emphasise the need to reform the CCP. 
Lamy stressed that the EU had proved itself as an effective representative of European interests in 
foreign economic policy. The current scope of the CCP, however, undermined the effective 
representation of European interests in the world economy. International trade negotiations 
increasingly focused on the regulation of investment, services trade and intellectual property rights, 
which were subject to unanimity voting within the Council of Ministers making it easy for third 
countries to divide and paralyse an enlarged EU. Lamy urged the delegates to extend qualified 
majority voting to all modern trade policy issues in essence demanding an extension of the scope of 
the CCP inter alia to investment regulation.53 Lamy’s efforts were only partly successful. While the 
final report of Working Group VII took up some proposals, it did not recommend the extension of the 
CCP to international investment regulation.54 
 
The Praesidium of the Convention convened on 23 April 2003.55 The purpose of this meeting was to 
examine and to transpose the recommendations of Working Group VII into a draft chapter on ‘external 
action’. With regard to the CCP, the Praesidium decided to divert from the recommendations of 
Working Group VII on an important point. The Praesidium proposed in its draft CCP articles to extend 
Union competences and qualified majority voting to the regulation of ‘FDI’. The Praesidium justified 
its decision by reiterating the Commission’s long-standing argument that investment flows 
complemented and substituted traditional trade. It was reported that John Bruton, delegate of the Irish 
Parliament and Praesidium member, had proposed the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. He 
reportedly stressed that FDI disciplines had become a standard issue of multilateral trade negotiations 
in the WTO and in FTA negotiations making an extension of the CCP necessary to ensure the 
effective representation of the EU’s interests. Giscard d’Estaing and the delegate of the Commission, 
                                                        
52 For this and the following see European Convention, ‘Intervention de M. Pascal Lamy, membre de la 
Commission Européenne, lors de la réunion du groupe de travail VII, le 15 octobre 2002 (working group VII - 
working document 10)’ 2002, 3. Interview with Convention participant, Brussels, 12 October 2011. 
53 European Convention, ‘Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action (CONV 459/02)’ 2002, 5-7. 
Interview with Convention participant, Brussels, 12 October 2011. 
54 European Convention, ‘Discussion Paper on External Action (CONV 161/02)’2002, 7-8.  
55 For this and the following see European Convention, ‘Proposed Amendments to the Text of the Articles of the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe - Common Commercial Policy’ 2003 <http://european-
convention.eu.int/EN/amendments/amendments3dd9.html?content=866&lang=EN> accessed 8 October 2013, 
53-55; Johannsen (n 6) 9-10; Markus Krajewski, ‘External Trade Law and the Constitutional Treaty: Towards a 
Federal and more Democratic Common Commercial Policy? (2005) 42 CMLR 91, 102-106. 
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Michel Barnier, enthusiastically supported the proposal and managed to convince the other Praesidium 
members.56 
 
One may wonder why the Praesidium and reportedly Bruton were so dedicated to bringing ‘FDI’ 
regulation under the scope of the CCP and exclusive Union competence. First, Ireland is the only 
Member State, which never concluded an IIA and which opposed the FDI reference until the very end 
of the drafting process. Second, it remains unclear why the rather narrow and unpractical term ‘FDI’ 
rather than international investment was proposed. One reason may be that the term ‘FDI’ is more 
directly tied to traditional trade than ‘international investment’ and thereby less controversial in the 
context of the CCP. One may recall that the European Commission had unsuccessfully proposed 
during the IGC on the Treaty of Amsterdam to extend the CCP to ‘FDI’ rather than ‘international 
investment’ as a compromise proposal after the debacle of Opinion 1/94. It is not far-fetched to 
assume that the Commission may have asked Praesidium members behind the scenes to reemphasis 
the issue as ‘neutral’ actors. This reading of the outcome of the Praesidium meeting would point to a 
remarkable instance of Commission entrepreneurship to the end of finally creating an EU international 
investment policy.  
 
7. 2 The Member State Delegates Seek the Deletion of the ‘FDI’ Reference 
Following the drafting exercise of the Praesidium, the delegates of the Convention reconvened for 
plenary sessions to discuss the Praesidium’s draft text of the ‘external action’ chapter. The delegates 
were highly interested in the draft chapter on ‘external action’. They tabled some 1,000 amendments 
regarding the ‘external action’ chapter and 100 amendments regarding the CCP articles. Thirty-one 
amendments concerned the proposed extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. The amendments 
demanded the deletion of the FDI reference. The delegates of the British, French, German, Irish and 
Spanish governments tabled 10 amendments to that end and elaborated that investment promotion and 
protection should remain under national competence, were not part of trade policy and the purpose of 
the reference remained unclear.57 A Convention observer recalled that only the delegate of the German 
government, Joschka Fischer, supposedly understood the implications of the FDI reference for 
Member States’ international investment policies and their BIT programmes. The opposition of 
France, the United Kingdom and Ireland mostly reflected their intention to protect their competences 
                                                        
56 Jan Ceyssens, ‘Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? Foreign Investment in the European 
Constitution’(2005) 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 273; Sophie Meunier, ‘Integration by Stealth – 
How the European Union Gained Competence over Foreign Direct Investment’ (2014) EUI Working Papers 
RSCAS 2014/66; Interview with Convention participant, Brussels, 12 October 2011. 
57 European Convention, ‘Proposed Amendments to the Text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe - Common Commercial Policy’ 2003 <http://european-
convention.eu.int/EN/amendments/amendments3dd9.html?content=866&lang=EN> accessed 8 October 2013. 
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and sovereignty against European encroachment. The Spanish delegate reportedly supported France so 
as to gain political capital in following discussions on voting rights in the Council of Ministers.58 
 
The large number of amendments on the ‘external action’ chapter overwhelmed the Praesidium. The 
Praesidium thus demanded the delegates to prioritise and table at most one amendment each in a new 
round. This procedural decision de facto saved the FDI reference from deletion. The delegates 
considered themselves as founding fathers of a European federal state and were unwilling to invest 
their limited political capital in this historic moment on technical issues such as the FDI reference. 
Hence, no delegate – including the delegates of the Member State governments – prioritised the 
deletion of the FDI reference in the second round of amendments. The delegate of the German 
government, Joschka Fischer, for instance reportedly invested his political capital in the creation of the 
post of a European Minister of Foreign Affairs, which he hoped to fill one day, and ignored many 
technical demands from the capital.59 The delegates ultimately adopted the draft text and sent it to the 
European Council for concluding intergovernmental negotiations and ratification on 18 July 2003. The 
observations suggest that the Convention method finally paved the way for the Commission’s long-
standing policy entrepreneurship to succeed and to extend the CCP to FDI regulation despite 
significant Member State opposition.  
 
7.3 Business Preferences – Ambivalent and Divided 
European business seemed generally little interested in the debates on a reform of the CCP. What is 
more, the preferences of European business were ambivalent and divided. Only UNICE – today 
BusinessEurope – voiced its support for an extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. On 28 February 
2002, UNICE released, in its capacity as formal observer to the Convention, a position paper 
enumerating its views on the Constitutional Treaty. UNICE advised extending qualified majority 
voting, and thereby the scope of the CCP, to FDI regulation, stating: 
 
In the context of the next Inter-Governmental Conference, UNICE strongly supports an 
extension of qualified majority voting to issues of major importance to business, such as 
international negotiations and agreements on services, intellectual property rights and 
foreign direct investment.60 
 
UNICE’s firm statement in support of an extension of the scope of the CCP to FDI regulation is 
remarkable. Many national member federations seemed much less interested and partly even opposed 
                                                        
58 Interview with Convention participant, Brussels, 12 October 2011. 
59 ibid.  
60 Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne (UNICE), ‘Commission White Paper on European 
Governance - UNICE position’ 2002, 6. 
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the proposed extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. The Confederation of British Industries (CBI), 
for instance, published its own position paper, in which it stressed that the EU should indeed play a 
role in international investment policy. It elaborated, however, that the Member States should remain 
competent in the core domains of international investment policy like investment protection. It stated: 
 
There is a good case for the extension of Community competence and [qualified majority 
voting] to cover negotiations on foreign direct investment. However, certain areas, such 
as bilateral investment treaties, decisions on inward and outward investment, export 
promotion and export financing would need to be ring-fenced.61 
 
German business was reportedly also critical.62 The German Federation of Industries (BDI) expounded 
its hesitation in detail in a position paper, which it released later on the occasion of the discussions on 
the Commission’s draft for the so-called ‘grandfathering regulation’.63 The BDI explained that German 
business worried that future IIAs negotiated by the EU might not attain the high level of investment 
protection of German BITs. German business also feared that the competence transfer might raise 
question marks over the continued validity of German BITs and thereby increase investment risks and 
costs. German business, moreover, lamented that trade and investment disciplines should not be 
included in the same agreements. Investment negotiations were about setting legal standards, whereas 
trade negotiations were about bargaining over market access concessions. The BDI manifestly worried 
that high investment protection and post-establishment treatment standards might be traded off for 
enhanced market access commitments. Finally, BDI and government officials interviewed for this 
study added that German business generally preferred keeping policy-making at the national level, 
because they perceived the EU’s political landscape as opaque and difficult to navigate.64 
 
Other major business federations, like the French Mouvement des Entreprises de France (Medef), the 
Italian Confindustria, the Spanish CEOE, the Polish Leviathan or the European Services Forum (ESF), 
took little interest in the debates on the CCP and its extension to FDI regulation. The Medef, for 
instance, participated in the Convention in its role as social partner in domestic collective wage 
bargaining. It almost exclusively focused on influencing debates on the Single Market and social 
policies and by and large ignored other policy areas. The Medef reportedly only took note of the 
debates on a reform of the CCP in regard to the proposed greater role of the European Parliament in 
                                                        
61 Confederation of British Industries (CBI), ‘Delivering a more Competitive Europe: the CBI’s View of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe’ (not dated) 4.  
62 Christian Tietje, ‘Gastbeitrag - Europa springt ein’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (29 January 2009).  
63 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), ‘Positionspapier: Internationale Investitionsförderverträge - 
Position der Deutschen Industrie zum Übergang der Kompetenzen auf die Europäische Union’ (2010). 
64 Interview with business representative, Berlin, 16 February 2012. Interview with German government official, 
Berlin, 17 February 2012. Interview with business representative, Brussels, 26 January 2012.   
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this domain.65 Confindustria and the CEOE reportedly were sympathetic to a greater role for the EU in 
foreign economic relations, because Italy and Spain were gradually losing in influence on the 
international political economy. They did not, however, lobby for a strengthening of the EU in this 
domain at the national or European level and did not hold specific preferences regarding the extension 
of the CCP to FDI regulation.66 The Polish Leviathan also adopted a generally pro-European attitude 
during the Convention debates. Polish business sought to counterbalance the Eurosceptic attitude of 
the Polish government. The Leviathan did not, however, voice specific demands regarding the CCP. 
Many other policy areas were much more important to Polish business than international trade and 
investment regulation.67 Finally, the ESF did not seek to influence the Convention debates on the CCP 
despite the investment intensiveness of international services trade. The ESF had been created in the 
mid-1990s in order to represent European service providers in EU-internal debates on WTO and FTA 
negotiations. Its institutional mandate did not allow lobbying on Treaty revisions. The ESF was only 
indirectly involved in the Convention debates through its membership of UNICE.68 
 
How can one explain the quite determined position of UNICE in favour of a CCP reform and 
extension to FDI regulation in light of the ambivalent and divided preferences of its member 
federations? UNICE adopts its positions by consensus after consultation with its member federations. 
The UNICE position should have at least partly reflected the hesitation of the BDI and CBI and lack 
of interest of many other federations regarding an extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. It was 
reported that the UNICE Secretariat drafted the UNICE position paper and circulated it among its 
member federations prior to the Convention.69  The member federations endorsed the CCP section 
without much discussion. It was only later in the process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty that 
certain member federations came to the conclusion – after having been alerted by their respective 
governments – that they actually preferred keeping international investment policy-making at the 
national level. These federations consequently tried to revise the official UNICE position regarding the 
extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. The UNICE Secretariat and other member federations were, 
however, unwilling to reopen discussions. The UNICE Secretariat understood that the shifting of 
international investment policy-making from the national to the European level would strengthen its 
position and influence vis-à-vis member federations. Other member federations realised that even 
though they had not proactively pushed for an extension of the CCP’s scope to FDI regulation it was 
likely to benefit them.  
 
                                                        
65 Interview with business representative, Paris, 3 October 2013.  
66 Interviews with business representatives, Brussels, 27 September 2013.  
67 Interview with business representative, by email, 4 September 2013.  
68 Interview with business representative, Brussels, 25 September 2013.  
69 For this and the following see interview with business representative, Brussels, 26 January 2012.  
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7.4 The Intergovernmental Conferences on the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties 
At the end of the Convention in summer 2003, the Constitutional Treaty – and the extension of the 
CCP to FDI regulation – were not yet set in stone. The Member States still had to give their formal 
blessing to the draft text in an IGC, which in principle allowed for the deletion of disagreeable articles. 
The European Council formally received the draft text of the Constitutional Treaty on 18 July 2003. It 
took the following intergovernmental conference almost a year, until 18 June 2004, to reach final 
agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. The work of the IGC was so time-consuming for two reasons. 
First and foremost, the Convention had not resolved the most delicate disagreements over issues of 
high politics like national voting rights, the definition of the qualified majority for Council votes and 
the role and powers of the EU President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Forging compromises on 
these issues proved to be a herculean task. Second, the Member States still disagreed over many 
technical provisions of the draft treaty. The Convention and its draft text, however, arguably possessed 
democratic legitimacy, which significantly limited the room for manoeuvre for possible modifications 
and intergovernmental trade-offs.70 
 
The revised CCP articles were of little interest during the IGC on the Constitutional Treaty. While 
some new Member States reportedly welcomed the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation, Portugal, 
Ireland, Germany and France remained critical. Yet, this coalition was reportedly unwilling to invest 
political capital to change such a technicality in the democratically legitimate treaty text in this 
domain. It managed, however, to introduce a new clause providing for the unanimous adoption of 
FDI-related measures in the Council of Ministers.71 
 
The Constitutional Treaty72 was signed on 29 October 2004. The final wording of Articles III-31473 
and III-31574 of the Constitutional Treaty on the CCP finally brought FDI regulation under the scope 
of the CCP and exclusive Union competence. The joy among European policy-makers over this 
‘milestone’ in modern European history was albeit short-lived. In spring 2005, the French and Dutch 
                                                        
70 Interview with Convention participant, Brussels, 12 October 2011. 
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public opted in referenda to reject the Constitutional Treaty. The negative outcomes of these votes in 
allegedly pro-European founding Member States made it politically impossible to further pursue the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. After a reflection period, European policy-makers came to the 
conclusion that the EU had, nevertheless, to be reformed in order to keep it governable after the 
Eastern enlargement. They decided to hold another IGC on the so-called Reform Treaty – today 
known as the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
The intergovernmental conference on the Treaty of Lisbon was held between 23 July 2007 and 13 
December 2007. The objective of the IGC was to preserve most technical revisions, while cutting back 
on the symbolic elements of the Constitutional Treaty. In consequence, the IGC decided not to reopen 
discussions on the – in relative terms – uncontroversial and technical CCP provisions. It was, 
moreover, reported that the leadership of DG Trade admonished its officials not to draw the attention 
of the Member States or NGOs to the FDI reference of the revised CCP articles. The Commission 
hoped that the IGC would not ‘rediscover’ the reference and simply nod it through.75 And indeed, in 
the end Articles 206 and 207 TFEU76  simply copied former Articles III-314 and III-315 of the 
Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009 and finally 
provided the EU with a firm legal competence to regulate FDI flows. 
 
8. Conclusion and Outlook 
The article traced the evolution of the EU’s competence in international investment policy from the 
Treaty of Rome (1958) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). So why and how did the EU gradually acquire 
legal competences in this key domain of international economic governance?  
 
8.1 An overview of the findings 
 
The findings of the article lend strong support to neo-functionalist and institutionalist thinking on 
European integration.77 The article shows that Commission entrepreneurship was decisive in extending 
the EU’s competences in international investment policy. It persistently pushed the issue onto IGC 
agendas, had strategic recourse to the CJEU and pointed to the evolving trade agenda in order to build 
momentum for a competence extension. While strategic recourse to the CJEU proved little effective, 
the Commission’s agenda-setting powers and reference to the evolving trade agenda in GATT/WTO 
and FTA negotiations left their imprint on policy-making debates. The argument did not prima facie 
convince the Member States, but the extending trade agenda kept the question of the EU’s 
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competences on IGC agendas until the Convention. In the Convention, the Praesidium finally took up 
the Commission’s argument and made the decision to add an FDI reference to current Articles 206 and 
207 TFEU. The reference ultimately remained in the Treaty text as national technocrats had only 
limited influence on the drafting process – unlike in classic IGCs – and high-ranking national 
politicians representing Member State governments showed unwilling to spend their political capital 
on the deletion of such technicalities from a democratically legitimate draft text. Instead they focused 
on questions of ‘high politics’ and the creation of a ‘European federal state’. Functional as well as 
power considerations motivated the Commission’s policy entrepreneurship. The intrinsic link between 
trade and investment indeed suggests that both phenomena should be dealt with under the CCP in 
order to ensure policy coherence and to avoid a distortion of the EU’s foreign economic relations. The 
Commission, however, arguably also pushed strongly for an extension of the Union’s competences to 
gain greater influence in a key domain of global economic governance. A second important factor 
contributing to the extension of the EU’s competences in international investment policy were 
unintended spill-overs from other EU policies. By agreeing to the creation of an external capital 
regime under the Maastricht Treaty and to the extension of the CCP to services trade under the Treaty 
of Nice, the Member States unintentionally transferred to the EU fringe competences relevant for the 
regulation of investment liberalization and post-establishment treatment. In consequence, the EU had 
to legally play a role in these domains of international investment policy.  
 
The Member States, on the other hand, did not push for a competence transfer. While they repeatedly 
empowered the Commission to negotiate on their behalf on investment disciplines in GATT, WTO 
and FTA negotiations,78 they determinedly rebuked the Commission attempts to extend the Union’s 
competences. The Member States’ opposition arguably echoed the natural reflex to protect their 
sovereignty and national BIT programs against European encroachment. The Convention nevertheless 
led to the extension of the EU’s competences, because – as mentioned above – the generalist 
politicians participating in the Convention unwillingly accepted the CCP extension so as to focus their 
attention on questions of high politics. European business, finally, seemed badly informed little 
interested or divided on the question whether the EU should be in charge of international investment 
policy. European business cannot be considered to have played a decisive role in the gradual extension 
of the EU’s competences in international investment policy.   
 
8.2 Implication – Bureaucrats Rather than Business Drive International Investment Policy-
Making 
What are the implications of these findings for policy-makers and current debates on the EU’s 
international investment policy? The article casts doubts over the widely held assumption that 
European business is the main driver of international investment policy-making in general and its 
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integration at the EU-level in particular.79 The article shows that European business lobbying cannot 
account for the extension of the CCP to FDI regulation. Research on the role of European business in 
international investment negotiations between the EU and third countries – such as during the 
Uruguay and Doha Round, on the Energy Charter Treaty or Multilateral Agreement on Investment – 
lends further support to this finding. Apart from investment liberalization, European business rarely 
voiced demands in these major international investment negotiations. Instead of businesses, national 
and European bureaucrats have been shaping international investment policy-making in the EU and in 
the Member States.80  
 
As political economy models account for business mobilisation and lobbying efforts on the basis of 
welfare impacts of policy measures, the finding implies that international investment policy and 
agreements may have only a limited impact on business operations, profits and welfare. The study 
thereby ties into a growing economic literature, which critically assesses the costs and benefits of 
international investment policy and agreements for states and national economies.81 Ultimately, the 
finding also has ramifications for current debates on reforming international investment policy and in 
particular investment protection and investor- state dispute settlement (ISDS). As business seems to 
take little interest in these issues – with the notable exception of the highly politicised debates on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – policy-makers may be much freer in 
reforming ISDS than often claimed in debates on TTIP. A reform of ISDS may not have significant 
negative effects on international investment activities, the operation of foreign affiliates and ultimately 
welfare as often warned.  
 
8.3 Outlook – The CJEU as a Political Actor Entering the Competence Struggle 
The findings of the article are furthermore of relevance as the struggle over the EU’s competences in 
international investment policy is not over yet. The Member States and the Commission cannot agree 
on a joint reading of the EU’s new competences under Articles 206 and 207 TFEU. Whereas some 
Member States endorse a narrow interpretation of the EU’s new competences, the Commission 
advances a broad interpretation.82 The breadth of the EU’s new competences may significantly affect 
the EU and the Member States’ capacity to act in the international investment regime. To resolve this 
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simmering dispute, the Commission has recently asked the CJEU to delimit the scope of the EU’s new 
competences in relation to the EU-Singapore FTA. 83  Against the background of this article, the 
Commission’s recourse to the CJEU appears as yet another step to consolidate the EU’s role in 
international investment policy. While this study does not seek to discuss the various methods to 
interpret European law and possible justifications for a narrow or broad interpretation of the EU’s new 
competences in international investment policy, it sheds extensive light on the travaux préparatoires. 
It shows that the authors of the European Treaties hardly intended to provide the EU with a firm legal 
competence in international investment policy. Hence, a historically-grounded interpretation of the 
new competence should lead to a narrow and literal interpretation of the EU’s new competences, 
which may limit the EU’s political room for manoeuvre in the international investment regime. An 
extensive literature discusses possible interpretations and delimitations in further detail.84  
 
In the context of the present study, it is more important to assess the political role of the CJEU in this 
– potentially – final stage of the competence struggle between the Commission and the Member 
States. It is commonplace in the political science literature85 that the CJEU is not only a neutral 
arbitrator of European law but a political actor. The CJEU generally champions integration-friendly 
interpretations of European law and seeks to protect its unique position and powers in the European 
legal order. With regard to the EU’s newly gained competence over FDI regulation, the CJEU may be 
torn between these two objectives. It may favour an extensive integration-friendly interpretation of the 
new Union competence covering all aspects of investment liberalization, post-establishment treatment 
and investment protection to consolidate the EU’s role as an effective representative of the Member 
States in the international trade and investment regime. 
 
On the other hand, the CJEU may champion a restrictive interpretation to circumscribe the EU’s role 
in investment protection, ISDS proceedings and before a future international investment court. The 
CJEU may be weary of the Commission’s aspirations to turn the EU into a major player in the global 
investment regime. Investment protection and ISDS challenge the CJEU’s monopoly to interpret 
European law in a binding manner, as arbitrators may have to interpret European law in ISDS 
proceedings. The CJEU is known to be critical and to circumscribe policy measures, which may 
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undermine its monopoly. Opinion 2/13 86  of the CJEU about the legality of the draft accession 
agreement between EU and Council of Europe regarding the EU’s accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) illustrates this case. While Article 6(2) of the Treaty on the 
European Union87 states that the EU shall accede to the ECHR, the CJEU found that the EU could not 
enter into the agreement and accede to the ECHR unless the European Court of Human Rights was 
forbidden from resolving disputes among Member States of the EU. Observers commented that 
Opinion 2/13 was a manifestation of judicial vanity.88 As similar situations may arise under IIAs and 
ISDS, it remains to be seen how the CJEU will interpret and delimit the EU’s new competences and 
how this may shape the EU’s ability to effectively represent European interests in the world economy.  
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